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What determines the economic links among organic farmers?  
Empirical evidence from Argentina 
 
Introduction 
 
Farmers are part of a competitive world system of production choices and costs, governmental 
support programs, market delivery systems, sources and pricing of inputs. Market 
globalization, products’ differentiation, agricultural industrialization, advances in food 
chemistry and technology, processing and packaging innovations, concentration at the retail 
level, contracting and integration, and new organisational forms affect farming and 
consumers’ decisions.  
The nature of risk in agriculture is changing substantially. Concerns about the environment, 
food safety, animal health and treatment, conservation, land use, food costs and labor 
conditions are among forces that impose additional requirements for larger investment, 
planning and management skills.  
Consumers’ food taste is changing, due largely to advertising and marketing. They demand 
specific product attributes which include safety, convenience, quality, location, health and 
nutrition, ethical issues, and processes attributes such as environmental quality, animal 
welfare or genetic modifications. The demand is generated at the retail level and passed back 
to producers, who have little or no input in the process. Thus, farmers are asked to produce 
what is demanded when the buyer demands it (Baarda, 2002).  
The nature of government support provided to farmers has also changed. There are multiple 
mechanisms such as food safety regulations, production subsidies and govermental assistance 
programs through which policy measures may affect producers’ decisions. The competition in 
this new context requires the development of skills and adaptive strategies to maintain market 
positioning and access to high value market niches. In the case of Argentina, the strategy of 
seeking higher prices through quality, food safety, certifications (organic, fair trade) and 
labeling has been adopted by many producers as well as promoted by the government and 
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other institutions. However, the markets for these products are more imperfect than the 
conventional ones.  Efficiency losses caused by market failures have been one of the most 
important drivers to encourage producers’ associations and other linkages across the market.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate the extent to which Argentinian organic producers 
operate in an associated way and which the determinants of this decision are. We model the 
links among farmers using count regression models in which the dependent variable is the 
number of links established by each surveyed farmer. The interviews were conducted between 
November 2004 and February 2005.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section one presents some theoretical discussion about the 
factors mentioned by the economic literature which explain the producers’ association, 
particularly focused on the organic sector. Section two overviews organic production in 
Argentina and describes the data used. Section three presents the econometric model and 
analyses the empirical results. The paper ends with some concluding remarks. 
Theoretical discussion 
The main economic discussions about the factors determining the producers’ association 
focuses on: economies of scale, market power, risk and uncertainty, externalities in the 
adoption of new technologies and transaction costs related to collective actions.  
Economies of scale: An increase in the production level leads to economies of scale when 
large fixed costs such as assets acquisition, certification costs and human capital investment 
exist. Although large producers and processors can achieve economies of scale, lowering per 
unit cost of production, individual farms may be too small to match these economies. In order 
to move up in the product chain and capture additional value added, small farmers require 
larger financial resources to invest in capital goods. So, by joining forces, small producers can 
achieve economies of scale in purchasing inputs, processing, marketing and distribution. 
Conveying accurate demand information through the industry’s chain, from consumers back 
to farmers, presents another challenge. In order to succeed, farmers must grow the right 
 
 4 
products at the right time and deliver them to the right place. However, even with access to 
information about the consumers´ desire, organic farmers must reach markets, negociate 
terms and deliver the product while simultaneously preserving organic quality and integrity. 
Therefore, organic farmers have to deal with increased logistic, control and training costs and 
they improve efficiency through collective action. 
Market power. Bargaining power, or lack thereof, has almost always been of concern to 
farmers. But it is an ever –increasing problem because of the increasing concentration of 
retailers and industry. In the organic sector, market power on demand side is more associated 
with wholesalers’ requirements for high quality standards and adequate quantities than with 
lower prices. In the case of Argentina, most organic farmers have access to international 
markets, either through few and large domestic brokers or through wholesalers abroad who 
trade using their own certification labels. Another source of market power comes from 
certification suppliers since only few national firms have international presence to certify 
export products. In consequence, certification becomes costly to small producers who try to 
reduce the burden by sharing it when it is possible. 
Risk and uncertainty: Since organic market is characterized as a niche, business 
opportunities are limited to well-informed and connected market agents. Links among 
producers increase human capital. Increasing linkages contribute to benefit less experienced 
farmers from others with superior capacity to identify new markets, negotiate contracts, 
explore new technological alternatives and exercise influence (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003). 
Organic Sector in Argentina and Data 
Argentina was the first developing country to have a national regulation adapted to the 
European Union and the first to enter the “third country” list. Its standards and national law 
date back to 1992. There are 12 national certifiers, some of them with a strong international 
presence. Currently, Argentina is the second country with the greatest organic area -2.4 
million hectares-, after Australia. Nevertheless, a major part is extensive grassland.  
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In the nineties, organic production expanded at a rapid rate, as Figure 1 shows, because of 
international market opportunities and premium-prices. Since 2001, this growth has ceased as 
a consequence of economic crisis and monetary devaluation that made conventional 
production relatively more competitive than organic.  
About 90% of the organic production has been oriented towards foreign markets, mainly to 
the European Union and USA. The main exports are cereals and oilseeds: corn, wheat, soy 
and sunflower. Fruits are also exported in large quantities: pears, apples, oranges and lemons, 
as well as some vegetables, especially garlic, onions and beans. Meat exporting began ten 
years ago with beef and, recently, Patagonian lamb exports have become relevant. The main 
processed products are: olive oil, sugar, juices, honey and wine.  
Even though the government does not provide direct subsidies or economic aid for organic 
production, there are a number of institutions such as official export agencies, the National 
Agrarian Research Institute, universities and local governments that provide some non- 
financial support.  
The survey was carried out in organic farms located in the main rural areas of the country 
where 121 producers were interviewed1. They were inquired about the activities they perform 
jointly with other farmers, classified in 15 topics differenciating between production-
processing and marketing activities. The first group includes: 1) inputs purchase, 2) capital  
investment, 3) new technics adoption, 4) training, 5) certification, 6) to increase scale of 
output, 7) to obtain credits and 8) to be beneficiary of government supports. The second group 
includes: 9) capital investment, 10) training, 11) certification, 12) to obtain credits, 13) to 
increase marketing scale, 14) to access exports market and 15) to be beneficiary of 
                                                 
1 According to national official reports there were 1.781 organic farms in 2004 (SENASA, 2005). The Northern 
Region is under-represented in the sample as consequence of the restrictions impossed by the large geographical 
dispersion in the country. 
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government supports. 
Econometric Model and Empirical Results  
The dependent variable is the number of links established by each farmer, which is the 
realization of nonnegative integer-valued random variables, i. e., farmers can establish zero, 
one, two, or n links (Figure 2). Therefore, a count data model is the appropriate technique to 
estimate the linking equation. Within this model the probability of a count is determined by a 
Poisson distribution, where the mean of the distribution is a function of the independent 
variables. The density of this distribution for the count (y) is given by: 
.Pr( / )
!
yey
y
µ µµ
−
=     for y = 0, 1, 2, ...         (1) 
where µ can be thought of as the mean or expected count. (Scott Long, 1997) This distribution 
has the defining characteristic that the variance equals the mean, a property known as 
equidispersion. 
In the Poisson regression model, the number of events y has a Poisson distribution with a 
conditional mean that depends on individual´s characteristics according to the structural 
model. The most common formulation for µ is: 
( ) ixi i iE y x e
βµ = | =   (2) 
Under the assumption that (yi|xi) are independent, this model can be estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood. Provided the conditional mean function is correctly specified and the conditional 
distribution of y is Poisson, the MLE  is consistent, efficient and asymptotically normally 
distributed. 
βˆ
If the mean-variance equality is rejected, the model is misspecified. One common alternative 
to the Poisson model is to estimate the parametres of the model using maximum likelihood of 
a negative binomial specification, which allows the variance to exceed the mean 
(overdispersion).  
( ) ( )(1 ( )V y E y E yα= +   (3) 
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The model NegBin II reflects the unobserved heterogeneity that the Poisson fails to capture 
by adding an additional parameter α. The Poisson model is a special case of the negative 
binomial when α= 0 (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).        
( )
( ) 1 .
i
i i
x
i i i
x x
i i
E y x e
V y x e eβ βα
βµ = | =
⎡ ⎤| = +⎣ ⎦
  (4) 
 
The recommended practice is to estimate both Poisson (PRM) and negative binomial 
(NBRM) models, and to perform a Wald test using the reported t statistic for the estimated α 
in the negative binomial model. Another test is the likelihood ratio, developed to examine the 
null hypothesis of no overdispersion, H0: α=0, which follows the Chi-squared distribution 
with one degree of freedom: 
22*(ln ln ) (1)NB poissonLR L L χ= − ∼       (5) 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, the NBRM is preferred to the PRM. 
Zero-inflated models handle overdispersion by changing the mean structure to explicitly 
model the production of zero counts (Long, 1997). These models assume two latents groups. 
One is the always-zero group and the other is the not-always-zero group. Thus, zero counts 
come from the former group and some of the latter group with a certain probability.  
The Voung´s statistic test compares the NBRM and ZINB models. If V is greater than 1,96, 
ZINB is preferred; if V is less than -1,96, the  NBRM is favored; and otherwise neither model 
is preferred (Long, 1997). 
 The Poisson and the negative binomial models are non-linear regressions. The derivative of 
equation (2) with respect to any explanatory variable x
j, 
yielding:  
( ) ( )ixi j j
j
E y e E
x
ββ β∂ = =∂ iy   (6) 
 
since , according to equation (2). Rearranging equation (6) results in:  ( ) ixiE y e
β=
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( ) 1
( )
i
j
j i
E y
x E y
β ∂= ∂    (7) 
βj is a semielasticity that can be interpreted as a proportionate change in the conditional mean 
when the explanatory variable x
j 
changes by one unit.  
Table 1 summarizes the variables included in the model and their means. 
Before proceeding with the parametric analysis, we explore the robustness of the results using 
the Wald and LR defined by equation (5) tests to evaluate whether the data were over or 
underdispersed in order to select the appropriate count model. The results of these tests are 
displayed in Table 2 and they indicate some evidence of overdispersion. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, implying that the PRM should not be used and the results are based on 
estimation of the NBRM.  
The ZIBN is also estimated but the Vuong test, 1,58 < 1,96, suggests that this model is not 
preferred to NBRM.  
The results of NBRM displayed in Table 1 indicate that the model performs well enough. 
Considering p ≤ 0,10, 13 out of 17 parameters are statistically significant and most of them 
have the expected sign.  
The number of channels used by the farmers (QCHANNELS) has a positive effect on the 
number of links a farmer establishes with others. One additional channel increases the 
conditional mean of the links in 31,6 %. This result might suggest that those farmers who sell 
through multiple channels support major risk which may be compensated with more links.  
The number of products (QPRODUCTS) acts in the opposite direction. A diversified 
production reduces the risk and  the potential benefits of collective action. 
The different kinds of products have the expected signs with regard to the base category: 
MEATS. The production of industrial crops (IND CROP) has been promoted by government 
policies that encouraged the association. In the case of fruits and vegetables (FRUITS&VEG) 
the incentives to linkage are related to the perishable nature of these products. Finally, cereal 
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producers (CEREALS) may benefit from economies of scale since this product is a 
commodity traded in large quantities. 
The age of the person who manages the farm (AGE) and his/her degree in Agricultural 
Sciences (AG PROF) are proxies to human capital. Elder producers have more experience and 
may be reluctant to new relationships. In the same way, agricultural professionals give less 
value to the marginal benefits of being linked to other farmers.      
On the other side, the strong dependence on family labor (FAMILY LABOR) might be a 
better proxy of small scale of production than farm size measured by dummies defined by the 
number of hectares (MEDSIZE and SMALLSIZE). The latter variables do not have the 
expected sign because most farms included in the base category (LARGE) are devoted to 
livestock production, which has been promoted by specific governmental programs.   
The dummies for Regions (NORTHENREG, PAMPREG, CUYOREG, SOUTHREG) are 
control variables used to deal with heterogeneity coming from socio-cultural and economic 
differences.   
Farmers linked with government programs (GOVSUP) are more likely connected among 
themselves because these programs usually require working in an associated way. Most of 
them include training actions which are more efficiently carried out in groups.   
To manage additional activities involved in processing (PROCESS), farmers are more willing 
to establish links with other producers. Likewise, a greater number of links may be expected 
if they choose the strategy of establishing links for all the goods produced (ALLPROD) or if 
they are members of a formal association (FORMAL).   
Concluding remarks 
This paper provides a fresh approach to a widely analyzed issue in agricultural economics. 
The number of links among producers performs well as a proxy of a more complex 
phenomena. The extent to which producers choose to operate in an associated way, in the 
Argentinian organic sector, is mainly determined by the number of marketing channels used 
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by the farmers, processing activities carried out, public support received, the scale of the farm 
and the kind of goods produced. This study contributes to understand farmer decisions about 
association. Moreover, the issue is particularly relevant to policy makers in developing 
countries where associations are promoted due to the emerging role of the social capital in the 
rural development policies design.  
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Table 1: Estimation results of the determinants of the number of links among producers 
 
Variable Coefficients z-Statistic Prob Type  Mean S.D. Definitions 
CUYOREG -0.313 -1.62 0.105 D.V. 0.29  1 if the Region is Cuyo 
NORTHENREG  0.168 0.58 0.564 D.V. 0.06  1 if the Region is North 
PAMPREG -0.280 -1.66 0.097 D.V. 0.39  1 if the Region is Pampean 
QCHANNELS  0.316 3.98 0.000 C.V. 1.52 0.75 # of marketing channels 
QPRODUCTS -0.081 -1.50 0.133 C.V. 2.27 1.33 # of products 
ALL PROD  0.410 2.73 0.006 D.V. 0.70  1 if the links involve whole products 
GOVSUP  0.234 1.88 0.060 D.V. 0.55  1 if  farm benefits from gov programs  
PROCESS  0.993 7.47 0.000 D.V. 0.48  1 if farm does some processing product 
IND. CROP  0.851 2.83 0.005 D.V. 0.16  1 if farm produces industrial crops 
FRUITS & VEG  0.629 2.31 0.021 D.V. 0.57  1 if farm produces fruits and vegetables 
CEREALS  0.789 2.86 0.004 D.V. 0.15  1 if farm produces cereals 
AG PROF -0.203 -1.32 0.188 D.V. 0.24  1 if manager is graduated in Ag Sciences 
SMALLSIZE -0.358 -1.38 0.166 D.V. 0.32  1 if farm area is less than 20 hectares 
MEDSIZE -0.487 -2.17 0.030 D.V. 0.48  1 if farm area is 1200 >hectares > 20  
FAMILY LABOR  0.649 3.60 0.000 D.V. 0.14  1 if farm employs only family labor  
FORMAL  0.419 3.20 0.001 D.V. 0.41  1 if farm is formal association member  
AGE  -0.011 -1.71 0.087 C.V. 49.8 11.6 Age of the farm manager (years) 
C  0.329 0.82 0.410     
QLINKS Dependent Variable Count 4.65 3.99 # of  activities farm does linked to another farms 
Log likelihood -257.08116  LR index (Pseudo R2)      0.1671 
Rest.L.likelihood -311.27413      
LR (17 df) 103.15 p > χ2 = 0.0000 Note: D.V. indicates a dummy variable and C.V. a continuous variable 
     
Table 2: Results of the Tests for Selecting between the PRM, NBRM and ZINB 
Test Coefficient  Statistics Prob  
Wald  (H0: α= 0)  α=0.0879  t =1.9011 p > |t| = 0.059 
LR (eq. 5)  χ2 = 6.21 p > |χ2| = 0.006 
Vuong  z = 1.58 p > |z| = 0.057 
 
Figure 1: Organic land (in thousand of hectares) and quantities (in tons) 
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Figure 2. Links observed among producers and the estimations of the models 
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